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COMPETITION ASPECTS OF PUBLIC LICENSES
by
TOMÁŠ KUBEŠA*
Public  licenses  have  earned  a  strong  position  in  both  protection  and  transfer
of Intellectual  Property Rights. Public  licenses are an essential  part of  activities
of many companies, projects and even research grants and their use is increasing.
This  development  means  that  IPRs  and  related  products  protected  by  public
licenses  engage  in  competition  with  products,  protected  by  more  traditional
licensing schemes. Thus, even public licenses must be assessed through competition
law scrutiny. Recent case law and scientific work1 clearly show that viewing public
licenses through competition law perspective is a difficult task and requires a deep
legal  assessment  and debate.  Many known competition  concepts,  such  as  price
fixing2, RPM3 or abuse of dominance4 do not seem to cope well with many common
provisions of  public  licenses.  This  article  will  summarise  existing state  of  such
debates,  introduce  competition  law  concepts  into  the  context  of  public  licenses
and offer  a  solid  competition  viewpoint  of  public  licenses.  The  outcome  of  this
article  will  answer  the  question  whether  and  when  can  public  licenses  breach
competition law rules. 
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1. PUBLIC LICENSES, COMMON PROVISIONS
Public  licenses  can  be  viewed  as  a  means  of  providing  the  author
the freedom  to  dispose  with  his  works  freely  and  offer  more  possible
* tomas.kubesa@mail.muni.cz, Ph.D. candidate at Faculty of Law, Masaryk University.
1 Välimäki, M. 2005, Rise of Open Source Licensing, Turre Pulishing, Helsinki, p. 78.
2 Art. 101, par. 1 let. a) Treaty on the Functionuing of the European Union.
3 Ibid.
4 Art. 102 TFEU.
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choices  than  traditional  copyright5.  They  also  provide  legal  certainty  to
users of works created by authors, who have decided not to enforce some
of the rights granted by copyright protection. 
Public licences also show a specific contractual process. In this process,
the author offers his work publicly to an undefined number of recipients
(for  example  online)  with  a  reference  to  the  license  and  its  terms6.
The license and its terms is to be provided by a third party for use by other
licensors. The other contractual party, the licensee, accepts the license and
its  terms  by  specific  performance,  usually  by  simply  using  the  work
in question.  The  third  party  that  provides  the  license  and  its  terms  can
guarantee  the  quality  of  the  license.  It  also  plays  an  important  role
in preventing  conflicts  between  different  public  licenses  in  derivative
works.
The contractual process can be altered in many ways, such as by using
a license  drafted  specifically  for  a  transaction,  by  offering  the  work  in
question  to  a  selected  audience  only  or  by  using  a  different  form  of
accepting the license. These changes, however, do not alter the substantive
nature of the public license. It is important to notice, that any alterations to
the  contractual  process  can  lead  to  unnecessary  difficulties  in  using  the
licensed works later.
At this point, we can identify many different public licenses. Some can
be used generally for a wide range of work while others are more suitable
for  more  specific  types  of  works,  such  as  databases7,  public  sector
information8 or software9. As mentioned above, anyone can create their own
public license therefore a definitive, exhaustive list cannot be established.
Some  of  the  most  influential  licenses  discussed  in  this  article  include
the Creative Commons, GNU GPL, EUPL10 and others.
Most of the public licenses contain a few significant common provisions.
Although their exact wording can differ,  the underlying concept remains
5 About Creative Commons, available at http://creativecommons.org/about.
6 About the Licenses, available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/.
7 For example the Open Database License, available at:
http://opendatacommons.org/licenses/odbl/1.0/.
8 For  example  the  License  to  Re-Use  Public  Sector  Information  under  European
Communities, available at http://psi.gov.ie/files/2010/03/PSI-Licence.pdf. 
9 For example the GNU GPL, available at http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html. 
10 European Union Public License, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Docbb6d.pdf?id=31979.
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similar. Such provisions concern the attribution requirements11, distribution
requirements12, (lack of) remuneration, the possibility of use in derivative
works13 and  alterations  of  the  work14,  possibility  of  commercial  use15,
liability  clauses16 and  licensing  requirements17.  These  provisions  form
the core  of  the  public  license  and  are  of  most  significance  also  for  the
antitrust scrutiny. They form a closely connected bond; however can also be
assessed separately.
The attribution provisions18 set the obligation to indicate the author of
the  work,  the  title  of  the  work  and  the  original  source.  Depending  on
a license, the exact form of the attribution clause can differ as well as the
amount of information provided according to it.
The distribution provisions19 indicate whether it is possible to distribute
the work further and what criteria must be met for such distribution.
The remuneration provisions set the price of the work. In public licenses,
this  price  is  set  as  zero  –  that  is  the  works  are  provided  for  free.  This
provision has significant impact to many aspects of the work and its use,
such as taxation or accounting.
The derivative provisions20 state whether it is possible to use the work
in other, derivative works and the conditions that must be met for such use.
The alteration provisions21 set  the conditions that are to be met when
the work is being altered and whether such alterations are possible.
The  commercial  use  provisions22 set,  whether  it  is  possible  to  use
the work  in  a  commercial  manner.  They  might  also  set  ways,  that  are
considered commercial and those that are not.
11 For example the wording in Creative Commons v. 4.0 available at:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode.
12 For example the wording in Creative Commons v. 4.0 available at:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode. 
13 For example the wording in Creative Commons v. 4.0 available at:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/legalcode. 
14 Ibid.
15 For example the wording in Creative Commons v. 4.0 available at:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/legalcode. 
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 See footnote 11 above.
19 See footnote 12 above.
20 See footnote 13 above.
21 Ibid.
22 See footnote 15 above.
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The  liability  clauses  limit  the  extent  of  the  liability  of  the  author  or
license  provider.  Commonly,  they limit  the liability  to  the  least  possible
extent23.
The licensing clauses set potential limitations to the type and content of a
license to be used for distributing the works and its  derivative works or
alterations24.
It  is  possible  to  conclude,  that  most  public  licenses  contain  similar
provisions.  Therefore, it  is  possible to use this list  for further assessment
of public licenses in competition law in general, without the need to limit
the argument to a specific public license. Some public licenses may contain
provisions  that  alter  the general  meaning  of the provisions  as  described
above25, however they will be omitted in this article.
2. COMPETITION AND ITS ABUSES
Competition  regulation  follows a  general  goal  of  consumer  welfare  that
is provided  by  competition  among  undertakings  that  engage  in
an economic activity. These undertakings generate pressure on each other
to  raise  quality,  lower  prices  and  innovate  in  order  to  keep  the  pace
or overcome their competitors26.  Under competition law, collusion among
such undertakings can be harmful as it restricts the competition and does
not lead to the desired outcome. Instead, uncertainty for all market players
is  believed to  be  beneficial  as  it  keeps  the  pressure  on  the  competitors.
Those  competitors  that  cannot  keep  the  pace  are  eventually  driven  out
of the  market.  It  is  possible  to  conclude,  that  competition  law  provides
a negative motivation for competition.
Copyright and IP rights in general follow a different path. They provide
a well-defined protection to an author or originator of a work or invention.
Under such  protection,  the authors or originators can exploit  their  work
or invention in an economical way, without disruptions from other market
players.  The consumer welfare is  achieved by motivating market players
to gain such protection, innovation and growth spurs on the way to this
23 For example the wording in Section 5, Creative Commons v. 4.0 available at:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode.
24 For example the wording in Section 2, Art. 5 Creative Commons v. 4.0 available at:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode.
25 For  example  some  copyleft  licenses  do  not  require  the  licensor  to  use  the  attribution
provisions.
26 Antitrust Overview, European Commission. Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/overview_en.html. 
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goal27.  We  can  conclude  that  IP  law  provides  a  positive  motivation
for competition. 
As  stated  above,  competition  law  and  IP  law,  including  copyright,
follow similar goals. However, we can still detect signs of conflict between
these two fields of law that cannot be resolved in a way introduced above.
One of such conflicts is the competition assessment of public licenses.
Competition  regulation  recognises  a  wide  range  of  abuses
of competition. Many of them seem relevant to public licensing, at least at
first glance.
We can sort the abuses into two main groups, horizontal and vertical
practises. The horizontal practises involve undertakings on the same level
of  the  market  chain.  These  undertakings  are  to  engage in  competition28.
The vertical practises involve undertakings on different levels of the market
chain,  usually  a  supplier  and  a  purchaser  or  customer  (not  necessarily
a consumer on this stage). These undertakings do not engage in competition
among each other; however their actions might have effect on consumers
or other market players29.
The most dangerous among the horizontal practises are the cartels30. In
a cartel,  the  undertakings  set  price  levels  or  business  conditions,  agree
to exclude others from their business activities or refuse access to essential
facilities  they  hold31.  The  cartel  activities  include  also  other  subjects  not
necessarily  active  on  the  given  relevant  market.  These  are  the  cartel
facilitator,  who  is  a  third  party  enabling  the  cartelists  collusion  or
the association  of  undertakings,  where  the  competitors  meet  with
a legitimate aim that develops into a collusive practise.
Among the vertical  practises,  the most important practises recognised
are the abuse of dominance32 and a vertical agreement33.
27 Art. 7 TRIPS Agreement, available at:
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm2_e.htm. 
28 Cartels Overview, European Commission. Available at:
 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/overview/index_en.html. 
29 The  Competition  Rules  for  Supply  and  Distribution  Agreements,  2012,  European
Commission,  available  for  download  at  http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/the-competition-
rules-for-supply-and-distribution-agreements-pbKD3211986/.
30 See footnote 28 above.
31 Rose, V., Bailey, D. 2013, European Union Law of Competition, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, p. 282.
32 Art. 102 TFEU.
33 Art. 101 TFEU.
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Under  the  abuse  of  dominance34,  a  dominant  undertaking  uses  its
market  power  to  harm its  remaining  competitors.  The core  requirement
to be met to declare an abuse is market dominance or a dominant position.
An undertaking  is  dominant  when it  is  able  to  act  independently  on its
suppliers,  customers and competitors in the terms of prices and business
conditions it  offers35.  Dominance is usually considered with undertakings
that exceed a certain size of a market share, however this presumption can
be  rebutted36.  A  dominant  undertaking  is  restricted  from certain  market
activities, such as dumping or margin squeeze37.
A  vertical  agreement  is  recognised  among  suppliers  and  customers
in the supply chain. The parties to such agreement fix their prices or agree
on business conditions offered further down the supply chain38.
The common element of the abovementioned abuses  is  an agreement
between  market  players  on  prices  or  business  conditions  to  be  offered
to their  customers,  limits  on production  or  similar  restrictions.  It  is  well
documented, that such conduct limits the effectivity, creates inefficiencies,
increases prices and reduces consumer welfare39.
3. RELEVANT MARKET IN PUBLIC LICENSING
An important  concept  in  competition  law and in  the  assessment  of  any
possible infringement is the relevant market40. A relevant product market is
defined  as  comprising  of  all  those  products  and/or  services  which  are
regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of
the  products'  characteristics,  their  prices  and  their  intended  use41.  The
relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the undertakings
concerned are involved in the supply and demand of products or services,
in  which  the  conditions  of  competition  are  sufficiently  homogeneous
34 Antitrust  Procedures  in  Abuse  of  Dominance,  European  Commission.  Available  at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/procedures_102_en.html. 
35 Gonzales-Diaz, F.E., Snelders, R. 2013, EU Competition Law, Claeys & Casteels, Deventer,
p. 68.
36 Ibid, p. 69.
37 Ibid, p. 116.
38 Rose, p. 412.
39 However  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  establish  the  exact  amount  of  damage  incurred  –
Komninos A., 2009, Quantifying Antitrust Damages, Publications Office of the European
Union, Luxembourg. Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/quantification_study.pdf.
40 Rose, p. 226.
41 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community
competition law, issued in the Official Journal C 372., art. 7 
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and which  can  be  distinguished  from  neighboring  areas  because  the
conditions  of  competition  are  appreciably  different  in  those  areas42.
The definition of a relevant market in a case is important in the assessment
of  the  infringement,  establishment  of  the  market  share  and  in  the
calculation of a fine43.  There are many tools used to establish  a relevant
market, such as the SSNIP test44.  The outcome of the application of these
tools  should be  a  market  that  includes  the  product  in  questions  and its
substitutes.
When public licenses are concerned, however, many common tests used
to establish a relevant product market tend to fail. For example the SNIPP
test45 uses  a  small  increase  in  price  (usually  5  –  10  %)  and  observes
the changes  in  demand.  If  the  demand  moves  to  another  product,  such
product belongs to the same relevant market46. The reason, why it fails in
public  licenses  is  obvious  –  10  %  increase  from  zero  price  is  still  zero,
therefore no changes in demand can be observed.
To establish a relevant product market, functional approach47 must be
used. In the assessment of the relevant product market, it is necessary to
analyse the functions the product fulfils, means it uses, resources it requires,
guarantees it offers and potentially a long list of other criteria that appear
on a  case  by case  basis.  It  is  also  necessary  to  keep in  mind,  that  such
analysis is sensitive to subjective perception of the criteria used, therefore
objective verification, such as market studies and surveys should be used.
From  the  abovementioned  market  tests,  one  rule  can  be  deduced.
A substitute  product,  offered on significantly more favourable terms (for
example much cheaper or even free) would, in the long run, push the less
favourable product out of the market48. This, however, did not happen with
products licensed under public licenses compared to products licensed by
42 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community
competition law, issued in the Official Journal C 372., art. 8
43 Definition of Relevant Market, European Commission. Available at:
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/competition/firms/l26073_en.htm. 
44 Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price. 
45 Gonzales-Diaz , p. 7.
46 Moresi, S.X., Salop S.C., Woodbury J. R.,2008, Implementing the Hypothetical Monopolist
SSNIP Test with Multi-Product Firms. The Antitrust Source. Available at:
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Feb08_Moresi.a
uthcheckdam.pdf
47 Also described as qualitative approach, Gonzales-Diaz , p. 18.
48 Niels,  G.,  Jenkins,  H.,  Kavanagh,  J.  2011,  Economics  for  Competition  Lawyers.  Oxford
University Press, Oxford, p. 32.
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more traditional licensing schemes. A conclusion, that just a long existing
difference  in  a  license  (public  or  other)  can  justify  a  classification  of
the products  with  the  same  function  as  belonging  to  different  relevant
markets, seems to be valid.
Another  reason,  why  the  relevant  market  definition  is  important,  is
the establishment of a market share. The size of a market share is relevant in
the  abuse  of  dominance  concepts  or  in  assessment  of  the  severity  of  an
infringement49. This concept does not seem to fit public licensing very well.
In  traditional  product  markets,  a  market  share  can  be  calculated  by
assessing the number of units sold or provided and the revenues made50. In
public licensing, there is no revenue at all to be assessed. This means, that
this method would lead to a conclusion, that with public licenses, all the
market shares are zero. This is not a correct conclusion. The method, based
on the number of units provided, does provide some results, but they do
not seem to be accurate. As the customer has to pay only transaction costs,
but  no actual  price,  he can easily  decide to simply  try a public  licensed
product he would never opt for if there were a price tag on it. Therefore, an
actual sale of a product that includes a money transfer differs significantly
from a simple provision of a public licensed product at a zero price and
only transactional costs. To conclude, none of the abovementioned methods
seems to produce a sufficiently accurate outcome. Yet again, we must use
the functional approach and market survey to establish how many of the
provided products are actually actively used. This approach should provide
more credible results.
At this point, it is important to notice one important question, asked by
Rubinfeld and Gal – What is the cost of free goods51? The idea of this question
is, that many kinds of goods provided for free are not really for free. The
consideration  in  question  can  be  non-monetary,  such  as  advertising  or
influence. We can also think of two-sided or even multi-sided markets. In
these  markets,  the  market  strength  gained  in  the  market  with  a  public
license can be abused on other markets, on other side of the two- or multi-
sided market52.  This  would require  a deep study into the functioning  of
such markets,  which is  beyond the scope of this article.  I will,  therefore,
49 Rose, p. 763.
50 Ibid.
51 Rubinfeld, D., Gal, M.S. 2014 'The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: Implications for Antitrust
Enforcement'. US Berkeley Public Research Paper no. 2529425. 
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keep  my  focus  on  the  so-called  real  free  goods  with  no  consideration
whatsoever.
4. POSSIBLE ABUSES OF COMPETITION CAUSED BY PUBLIC
LICENCES
The abovementioned introduction leads to a conclusion, that there are three
basic  possible abuses  relevant to public  licenses.  These would be a price
fixing  cartel,  a  margin  squeeze/dumping  and  an  RPM.  This  part  of
the article will analyse them separately using the background from previous
chapters and attempt to reach a conclusion, whether these are actual abuses
of public licenses or not.
The evidence of a price fixing in public licenses takes the form of the fact
that the works are provided for free in connection with the SA clause53. This
basically means, that all those, who provide the licensed product, agree to
provide it on similar terms and for a fixed price. This conclusion is correct;
however  it  would be  unreasonably early to  finish  the analysis  with this
result and conclude that there is a cartel. 
The very idea of a price  fixing cartel is  based on an assumption that
the price  is  fixed  on  a  basis  that  is  higher  than  a  market  price,  to
the detriment  of  a  consumer.  The  idea  of  an  exclusionary  cartel  is  that
the price  is  below the market  price,  but  will  be increased above it,  once
the undertakings not involved in the cartel will leave the market, to recoup
the  incurred  losses  and  gain  profit,  yet  again  to  the  detriment  of  the
consumer. Therefore, the cartel increases prices on the market, right away
or after partial objectives are met54.
None of this  is  possible  with the use of public  licenses.  They do not
provide anyone with the power to increase the price, immediately or in any
time  in  the  future.  The  price  set  by  the  public  license  is  zero  that  is
the lowest  possible  price.  Therefore,  it  is  not  possible  to  establish  any
detriment to a consumer, real or potential. Under such circumstances, we
cannot conclude, that there is a cartel, price fixing nor exclusionary.
52 Such  market  situation  appears  with  Google  and its  search  function  (provided  for  free)
connected with the advertising bussiness (paid by advertisers) and content provision (both
paid and free), payment cards with free issuing (by card-holders, although not exclusively
free) and paid acquiring (by merchants) sides.
53 See footnote 12 above
54 Rose, p. 301.
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The evidence of a margin squeeze/dumping is similar to that of a cartel,
that is the requirement for the works to be provided for free. The difference
is, that the margin squeeze/dumping are relevant in vertical relationships
on the market involving a dominant undertaking.
We have assessed the difficulties  in  establishing market power in  the
previous chapter. Even with these in mind, a market situation with a large
market  share  held  by  a  product  under  public  license  is  possible.  Such
market  share  can  even  fit  the  rebuttable  presumption,  that  it  provides
a foundation  for  market  dominance.  However,  market  dominance  is
defined as a market position so strong, that the dominant undertaking can
behave independently on its suppliers, competitors and customers55. Such
independence  can  take  forms  of  pricing  behaviour  or  the  business
conditions  imposed56.  It  is  possible  to  conclude,  that  such  independence
must be related to important aspects of the undertakings business policy. To
establish market dominance in relation to public licenses, further analysis is
required.
The main point of such analysis has to be, whether a public license can
allow  independent  behaviour  of  an  undertaking.  A  public  license  is
relatively restrictive in this manner. Both price and business conditions are
quite  beneficial  for  the  customer,  however  also  quite  strictly  set  by
the license. The restrictive nature of these provisions is common to public
licenses  in  general.  An  undertaking,  that  decides  to  opt  for  a  public
licensing scheme, will not be able to avoid these provisions. In turn, these
provisions lead to the limitation of the independence of the undertakings
market behaviour, once the decision to opt for public license is made. In
general,  we  can  conclude,  that  public  license,  used  for  a  product,  is
a limiting factor in pronouncing market dominance of an undertaking based
on such a product.
Abuse of dominance is a concept that can barely be applied to public
licenses.  One  reason  is  the  abovementioned  difficulty  with  establishing
the market dominance as a preliminary condition for an abuse. The other
reason is the fact, that we can find it difficult to establish a type of an abuse
that fits possible situations with public licenses.
55 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities - Case 85/76.
56 Rose, p. 791.
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The best fitting type of an abuse, that could be related to public licenses,
would  be  margin  squeeze/dumping57.  In  a  margin  squeeze/dumping
scheme a dominant  undertaking drops its  prices  below costs or imposes
business  conditions  that  cannot  be  countered  by  other  undertakings  in
the market, while taking loses. This creates pressure on other undertakings
on  the  market  and  should  cause  them  to  leave  the  market.  Once  this
happens,  the  dominant  increases  its  prices  or  changes  the  business
conditions  and  recoups  its  loss  incurred58.  As  was  discussed  with
exclusionary cartel, this is not possible with public licenses as no one has
the legal means of increasing the price on a product under a public license59.
This conclusion can be also understood as further proof, showing that
products licensed under public licenses and under traditional licenses form
different  markets.  In  many  cases,  we  can  see  nearly  similar  products
distributed under both kinds of licenses, parallel to each other for years60.
Yet still, the public licensed product did not push the other product out of
the market and has even not gained significant market share.
We can conclude, that public licenses do not threaten competition under
the concept of abuse of dominance.
The  last  relevant  market  abuse  relevant  to  public  licenses  would  be
the RPM61.  Under  RPM,  a  supplier  and  customer  agree  on  prices  or
conditions of further resale of a product. Such a vertical agreement is often
used in order to limit intra-brand competition or mitigate the differences
among distribution channels62. Their result is an increase in prices or less
favourable business conditions for the end-customer or consumer. We can
also clearly see that there has to be a price that can be increased by the RPM
or business conditions that can be different among distribution channels.
None of that is possible under public licenses. The assessment of an RPM
57 Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission of the European Communities – Case T-271/03.
58 Rose, p. 797.
59 Daniel  Wallace vs. IBM Inc., Red Hat Inc., and Novell  Inc. (no. 06-2454, 7th cir.,  Nov. 9
2006). 467 F.3d 1104 (7th Cir. 2006).
60 For example the Microsoft Office software being distributed alongside the OpenOffice and
LibreOffice  software.  As  it  is  difficult  to  measure  market  share  of  OpenOffice  and
LibreOffice, there are many studies showing different results. The gap between the market
shares seems to stretch over 40 – 80%. See also International OpenOffice market shares
available at http://www.webmasterpro.de/portal/news/2010/02/05/international-openoffice-
market-shares.html or Webanalyse:  OpenOffice auf über 21% der Computer available  at
http://www.webmasterpro.de/portal/news/2010/01/25/verbreitung-von-office-programmen-
openoffice-ueber-21.html.
61 Guidelines  on  Vertical  Restraints,  European  Commission.  Available  at:
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/guidelines_vertical_en.pdf
62 Rose, p. 426.
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abuse  is  more  complicated  as  it  is  a  hard-core  abuse63,  however
the application of the safe harbour of Art. 101/3 TFEU should be a sufficient
measure to declare public licenses compliant with competition law.
We can therefore conclude that public licenses do not constitute a RPM
abuse.
The  general  conclusion  to  be  drawn from this  chapter  is  that  public
licenses do not constitute an abuse of competition law. However, it is also
important to notice, that this conclusion is valid only on relevant markets
other than two-sided or multi-sided. On such markets, the market power
gained  on  one  side  can  be  misused  on  the  other.  Such  scenarios  are
potentially relevant as comparable cases already exist64.
5. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
The research question of this paper brings certain procedural aspects that
should not be omitted in the assessment of the conclusions. Such aspects
constitute  large  obstacles  to  possible  investigation  by  a  competition
authority into alleged anticompetitive practises involving public licenses.
The  first  obstacle  to  be  tackled is  the  establishment  of  the  parties  to
a proceeding65. As we understand from previous chapters, public licensed
products can be always freely distributed, if the relevant conditions are met.
On a following basis, many such products allow for alterations by others.
Under such conditions,  it  is  impossible to establish,  who was the creator
and distributor of a product that caused the investigated infringement and
therefore should be a party to a proceeding. The original work before all
possible alterations can be very different from the product that has caused
the infringement; therefore its author should not be liable for it as his work
had nothing to do with the infringement. On the other hand, the authors
of alterations,  modifications  or  improvements  have  all  contributed  with
minor changes to a work. None of such contributors should then be liable
for the whole product. It is also important to notice, that such contributors
might  be  located  in  many  different  jurisdictions,  which  makes
the investigations even more complicated.
63 Art. 4, Commission regulation 330/2010 on the application of Art. 101/3 TFEU to categories
of vertical agreements and concerted practises.
64 Such  as  the  current  Google  case  No.  39740  with  case  information  available  at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39740
65 Svetlicinii, A. 2011, Who is to Blame? Liability of 'Economic Units' for Infringements of EU
Competition Law, European Law Reporter, vol. 2, p. 52 – 56.
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It is also impossible to establish, who the distributor with a market share
is as anyone acquiring a copy of the product might be a distributor as well.
Relating a number of provided licenses or a market share to a single subject
or a definitive  list  of  sufficiently  identified subjects  might  be excessively
difficult or even impossible.
For these reasons, a competition authority might find it  impossible to
establish parties to a proceeding with appropriate reasoning.
The second obstacle is the calculation of a fine66. In many legal systems,
the  fine  is  calculated  on  a  basis  of  sales  of  a  product  affected  by
the agreement or practise67. With public licenses, the basis would equal to
zero as there is zero price.
For this reason, it is impossible to calculate a fine using the established
methods.
The third and last obstacles to be discussed are the interim measures68
and commitments69. A competition authority can award interim measures
or accept commitments that should remove the anticompetitive constraint
from the  market  and  allow  for  undistorted  competition.  Such  measures
include  an  enforced  change  in  business  practices,  a  ban  on  further
fulfilment of a cartel or other suitable means70. All of these means should be
addressed to a specific subject and can be enforced upon them.
With public licenses, however, interim measures do not seem to work. It
is  impossible  to  address  them  to  a  liable  undertaking  as  the  relevant
undertakings  might  be  outside  of  its  jurisdiction  or  unable  to  actually
perform  these  measures.  At  any  time,  there  can  be  a  subject  outside
the jurisdiction of the competition authority or unaware of its decision that
can provide all the other users of the product with a valid license to the
product in question.
To conclude this chapter, investigation by a competition authority would
face  significant  difficulties  form  the  very  beginning  to  the  end.  These
difficulties  seem  impossible  to  overcome  in  a  constructive  way.  This
66 Guidelines  on  the  method  of  setting  fines  imposed  pursuant  to  Article  23(2)(a)  of
Regulation No 1/2003, European Commission, available at:
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/competition/firms/l26118_en.htm
67 Ibid.
68 Antitrust Manual of Procedures, European Commission, 2012. Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/antitrust_manproc_3_2012_en.pdf, p. 191.
69 Council Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, art. 9. 
70 Antitrust Manual of Procedures, p. 177. 
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significantly  limits  the  chances  of  a  successful  case  by  the  competition
regulator.
5. CONCLUSIONS
At  the  first  glance,  public  licenses  might  cause  significant  competitive
constraints.  However, after deeper assessment, study of the provisions of
common  public  licenses,  assessing  most  important  competition  law
infringements and applying competition law concepts on public  licenses,
the  only  valid  outcome  is  that  public  licenses  do  not  constitute
a competition  law  infringement.  A  competition  authority,  that  would
attempt to verify this conclusion by an investigation, would face significant
obstacles that cannot be overcome within current legal means.
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